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WHAT A WASTE OF MANNA : 
AID, INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTS OF LESOTHO 
ABSTRACT. Lesotho finances its development effort almost entirely 
through the commitment of international aid. The major share of 
this revenue accrues directly or indirectly to the South African 
economy. Whilst it is inevitable that South Africa will benefit 
from the disbursement of international funds to an open, dependent 
and neighbouring economy, the Lesotho government does little to 
regulate the leakage of this and domestic capital to the Republic 
and increase its local retention, assimilation, investment and 
circulation. In fact, various aspects of government administration 
and policy tend to aggravate the problem of capital leakage, namely; 
the inefficiency of, and corruption within, public financial control; 
the reversal in development strategy from a rural/agricultural to a 
modem sector option; and the consignment of industrial development to 
foreign, mainly South African and South African based, capital. This 
paper attempts to demonstrate how these factors contribute to and 
exacerbate the process of capital drainage. 
INTRODUCTION 
There can be few countries with poorer prospects than Lesotho for 
the development of a viable domestic economy. The country has almost 
no industry and few resources (Wallman, 1972; World Bank, 1975) and 
the national economy is therefore based upon a subsistence mode of 
herding and cultivation (Ntsane and Eckert, 1978; Sterkenberg, 1980; 
Turner, 1978) which, in turn, rests upon a notoriously fragile 
ecology (Schmitz, 1983) GNP per capita was estimated at only 
R238 in 1977/78 (GOL, 1980, 10) and several studies conducted in 
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both urban (Marries and van der Wiel, 1975; Metcalf, 1981; 
Wei lings, 1983a) and rural locations (Murray, 1981) suggest a 
deterioration rather than an improvement in poverty levels. 
Whilst international aid has become increasingly important to 
Lesotho's development effort, the country survives only through 
its participation in the Southern African regional economy. This 
dependence has become more and not less firmly entrenched since 
Lesotho won independence from Britain in October 1966. Lesotho's 
trade deficit increased from R75.1m in 1974/75 to R189.9m in 
1977/78 (GOL, 1980, 16) and the percentage of imports covered by 
exports dropped from 11.5% to 6% (GOL, 1980, 13). This deficit 
(1977/78) was financed chiefly by migrant labour remittances 
(62%), Customs Union receipts (17%), international aid (13%) 
and tourism (4,8%) (GOL, 1980, 13). 
It has been argued by several writers that much of Lesotho's 
present and continuing underdevelopment may be attributed to 
the function it has assumed in the regional economy (Crush, 1982; 
Murray 1980a; Leys 1979). Historically, Lesotho was absorbed 
within the arena of white capital, initially as an exporter of 
grain but subsequently as a supplier of cheap migrant labour. 
This, it is alleged, led directly to the underdevelopment of 
peasant production. (Kimble, 1978). 
The current dependence upon, and the debilitating effect of, 
labour migration on Lesotho has been the subject of several 
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critical studies (Elkan, 1980; Leys, 1979; van der Wiel, 1977). 
The impact upon rural production has been disastrous (Kimble,1978; 
Murray, 1980b, 1981); some 70% of rural household income is now 
obtained from migrant remittances. Labour migration has also 
been responsible for the breakdown of traditional social relations 
(Gay, 1980a;1980b; Gordon, 1981), the acceleration of rural-urban 
migration (Jilbert, 1977; Piek, 1971; Wilkinson, 1983) and the 
consequent expansion of unplanned peri-urban settlements 
(Wellings, 1983a). 
Lesotho's dependence on migrant remittances is so deep that any 
substantial decline in their value will have very serious reper-
cussions on the economy. And, there are definite signs that 
South Africa will not continue to absorb Basotho labour at the 
present rate. Four factors have contributed to this. In recent 
years, the South African state has been intent on 'internalising' 
its migrant labour force for political reasons (Taylor, 1982) 
although this has so far had most impact upon Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. Secondly, rising unemployment in South Africa has 
reduced the demand for imported labour. Thirdly, the capital-
isation of South African productive capacity which took place 
in the 1970
1
s has led to a declining demand for labour. And 
finally, South African policies have had the effect of concent-
rating Basotho migrants into the mining sector where they are 
more vulnerable to changes in general economic conditions and to 
the rising capital: labour ratios in that industry. The level 
of Basotho migration has remained more or less steady for several 
years. Eckert (1983, 253), in fact, estimates an average annual 
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rate of decline of 3.53 between 1980 and 2000. Whether this actually 
happens remains to be seen but the static level of migration has 
already led to a drop in the real value of remittances. Between 
1974/75 and 1975/76, migrant remittances to Lesotho increased in 
real value by 34%, but fell by 7% between 1977/78 and 1978/79 
(GOL, 1980, 18-19). Besides the direct loss of income to receiver 
households, this affects government revenue via the Customs Union. 
Migrant earnings are the major determinant of the propensity to import 
from the Republic and hence Customs Union receipts. In 1977/78, 50,9% 
of Customs Union revenue derived from imports purchased by migrants 
and their families. But, by 1979/80, this contribution had fallen 
to 40,4% (GOL, 1980, 63). 
Customs Union revenue, the second major parameter of Lesotho's 
dependence, derives from purchases of foreign (mainly South African) 
goods and services, and is collected into a common pool administered 
by the Republic and redistributed to members (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa constitute the membership of SACU) with 
a two year time-lag in accordance with a complicated and structurally 
unstable formula. 
Lesotho has consistently attempted to negotiate a larger proportional 
allocation and more favourable contractual terms from SACU but although 
academic commentators are divided on the issue (Collings, 1978; 
Ettinger, 1973; Mosley, 1978; Robson, 1978, Hudson, 1981), there 
would seem to be few ways in which Lesotho could be substantially 
better off outside the Custom's Union (Cobbe, 1980). However, the 
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major argument against membership is that it discourages import sub-
stitution. Indeed, it has been estimated that the decline in the real 
value of migrant remittances and the increase of local production of 
items normally imported from the Republic will result in a 10% reduct-
ion of the value of Lesotho's Customs Union receipts between 1980 and 
1985 (GOL, 1980, 21). 
The third major aspect of Lesotho's dependence is its reliance 
upon trade with the Republic. Only 28% of Lesotho's exports find 
their way out of South Africa (GOL, 1980, 26) and almost 90% of 
Lesotho's imports come from the Republic (GOL, 1980, 14). 
Moreover, all international imports pass through South African hands. 
Lesotho became acutely conscious of this aspect of dependence during 
the Transkei 'emergency' of 1976 and during 1983 when the borders 
were subjected to more stringent controls. 
Lesotho's severely limited resource base, its fragile agricultural 
economy and its chronic dependence upon South Africa constitute the 
three major obstacles to genuine, equitable and sustainable national 
development. Whilst it is obvious that Lesotho can never be entirely 
independent of its neighbour, the reduction of this dependence has 
become the central theme of development policy (GOL, 1970; 1975; 
1980; IL0, 1979; World Bank, 1975), and hence the major objective 
of international aid donors (Curry, 1980; Jones, 1977; Singh, 1982). 
Since independence Lesotho has been remarkably successful in 
attracting disbursements of international aid. Up to 1966, 
Britain was almost the only donor, donating R8.6m in that year 
mostly in the form of a subsidy to government revenue. In 1980/81, 
however, R56.4m was committed to Lesotho in grant form, R20.0m in 
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technical assistance, and a further R20.4m in commercial and soft 
term loans, a total of R96.8m divided among-24 major donors (Wellings, 
1982, 268-70). Lesotho's dependence upon foreign aid for its devel-
opment programme is illustrated by the fact that the government cont-
ributed only 17.6% of National Development Expenditure in 1980/81. 
Whilst this proportion has increased from 12.5% in the period 1965/66 
to 1971/72 (Jones, 1977, 179-80), the absolute shortfall in local 
participation has risen alarmingly; from R18.8m in 1974/75 to 
R105.84m in 1980/81 (Wellings, 1982, 270). 
Whilst this form of dependence is generally disturbing, Lesotho is 
not confronted by many of the problems commonly associated with it. 
Many of the traditional arguments against aid - the creation of 
indebtedness, the tying of expenditure, and the manipulation of 
economic policy with reference to the interests of international 
capital - cannot be sustained in this particular case. Not only 
does Lesotho receive a relatively disproportionate volume of aid 
per capita but most of it is disbursed on unusually generous terms. 
In comparison with other African countries, interest rates are low, 
maturities and grant element high, debt service and debt outstanding 
insignificant, and the government appears capable of manipulating 
the donors with considerable success (Wellings, 1982, 273-274). 
For example, Britain is committing R10.7m to Lesotho in the period 
1982/83 all on grant terms, Lesotho being the only recipient of 
British aid to secure an increase in the real value of allocations 
over 1981/82.
3 
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But whilst the official objective of aid is to reduce Lesotho's 
dependence, its effect has been to increase it through the 'leakage' 
of foreign funds to the South African economy. It has been estimated 
that between 60% and 80% of externally derived funds are rerouted 
to South Africa via Lesotho recipients. The diverse channels through 
which aid filters over the border have been documented in an earlier 
paper (Weilings, 1982) so it is only necessary to briefly review 
the situation here. 
Unrestricted aid donations, for example, are treated in the same 
way as government revenue and are used openly to make direct 
purchases of South African goods and services. Tied aid is a 
little different, coming in a package containing various regulations 
and restrictions on use. Normal practice is that purchases must 
be made in the donor country but under certain circumstances this 
regulation may be waived to allow 'local or third-country' purchases. 
In the case of Lesotho, the waiver system is commonly employed and 
subject to abuse. 
Capital may also drain to South Africa indirectly through the local 
economy via purchases from South African companies operating in 
Lesotho, purchases from Sesotho companies which import their stock 
from the Republic, the submission of contract tenders from government 
departments, parastatals and individual projects to South African 
companies or to Sesotho businesses which subcontract to firms in the 
Republic. In addition, only a very small percentage of expatriate 
and Sesotho salaries, funded by technical assistance, accrues to 
the domestic economy since most of it is used to import South 
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African goods and services. In the absence of detailed accounts 
of expenditure, it is impossible to be precise as to the magnitude 
of capital drainage. However, taking both government revenue and 
international donations into consideration, one estimate of the 
leakage on public contracts is R200m p.a. Private purchases must 
be added to this figure. 
The scale of capital drainage may be further illustrated by the 
following figures from the Roads Department in the Lesotho Ministry 
4 
of Works. For the financial year 1982/83, expenditure was in the 
region of R30.5m, of which 3956 was provided by the Lesotho govern-
ment and the remainder by eight international donors. Expenditure 
is divided into four major categories; hire of plant (R15.25m), 
hire of transport (R6.10m), materials (R6.10m), and labour (R3.05m). 
South African contractors claim at least 40% of plant charges and 
75% of vehicle sales and hire charges. In addition, practically 
all materials, even if they are purchased within Lesotho, come 
from South Africa. Thus R16.8m (55% of total expenditure) finds 
its way to South Africa. However, the feeling is that this is a 
conservative figure given the liberal application of the waiver 
system, because overseas delivery delays enforce subcontracting 
to South African companies and because all maintenance is carried 
out by South African operators whatever the make of plant or 
vehicle. 
The importance of capital leakage is also evident in border towns 
such as Ladybrand, Ficksburg and Matatiele. In 1978, for example, 
- 9 -
Ficksburg, with a trade turnover of R13m p.a and a growth rate of 
5 
25% p.a., was seriously described as a "boom town". The cause of 
this was an increase in border traffic and 1n the purchasing power 
of Basotho shoppers and of government departments. The former was 
largely an outcome of wage inpreases in the mines but the latter 
was chiefly a product of aid Inflows. 
Similarly, Matatiele relies mostly upon private shoppers travelling 
from southern Lesotho and, during the Transkel 'emergency' of 1976, 
this trade dried up almost completely. In that year, the Qacha's 
Nek and Ramatseliso gates bordering on Transkei were closed and 
Basotho, who customarily shopped 1n Matatiele, were faced either 
with an illegal trek.over the mountains or a tedious journey to the 
remote and inaccessible gate at Ongeluksnek adding at least a day 
to the journey. But although the border is still officially shut, 
by 1977 the flow of shoppers was almost back to normal.
 6 
The drainage of capital to South Africa has provoked concern but 
not effective action on the part of the Lesotho government. In 
December 1978, L. Makhaloa, warned that "... we have been aware 
for some time that South Africa is enjoying most of the benefits 
of foreign aid as supplied to Lesotho by the international commun-
ity".
7
 Several controls were suggested; restrictions on funds 
spent in South Africa, Import embargoes, and the introduction 
of local currency. But whilst the second and third of these 
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measures have been implemented their impact is minimal. Embargoes 
cover only a few products to protect local monopolies, border 
controls are haphazard, and Maluti currency is readily acceptable 
in South African border towns while Rands are easily available 
inside Lesotho. 
Moreover, as will be shown later, the process of capital leakage 
is exacerbated by five factors; inefficient management of the 
public accounts and disorganised financial control in individual 
projects; corruption in the bureaucracy which in some instances 
involves collusion with South African business to defraud the 
donors and the government; a tendency within government to embark 
on expensive political projects of dubious developmental value 
often operating in isolation of and in opposition to those funded 
externally; the shift towards a more capital-intensive and urban-
biased development strategy, and the move towards active encourage-
ment of South African investment in Lesotho. The purpose of the 
present paper is to examine these factors in greater depth. 
FINANCIAL CONTROL AND CAPITAL LEAKAGE 
In common with many developing countries (Beenstock, 1979; Gould, 
1980; Hyden, 1983; Tordoff, 1981- Wade, 1982), development admin-
istration in Lesotho is chronically inefficient. However, it was 
not until the publication of the Hepon if the Audi tor-General 
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(Tarr, 1982) that this inefficiency was documented in any detail 
and its effect upon capital leakage was described. This extra-
ordinary document - withdrawn from circulation by the government 
soon after publication - throws light on many of the mechanisms 
bleeding capital from Lesotho's economy. As such it merits close 
attention but since a substantial review of its contents is avail-
able elsewhere (Wellings, 1983b), only the major themes will be 
developed here. 
The function of an audit - in this case of the public accounts 
from March 1975 to March 1978 - is to ascertain whether all public 
monies are fully accounted for and that the procedures applied are 
sufficient to secure an effective check on the assessment, collect-
ion and proper allocation of the revenue. Thus, it would normally 
amount to little more than a certificate. Instead, Tarr fills 118 
pages commenting at length on irregularities in financial control; 
errors and omissions in the monitoring of transactions; the absence 
of documents supporting these transactions; the chaotic storage of 
records and source documents; and disparities between the statement 
data and Treasury statistics. In Tarr's words,
 1
 ... it proved 
impossible to express an opinion on the fairness or reasonableness 
O 
of the state of financial affairs in the Government of L e s o t h o ' , 
and consequently he
 1
 ... decided not to provide the usual comment-
g 
ary on the budgetary out-turn for the three financial years' but 
proceeds to catalogue a selection of incidences demonstrative of 
the laxity of local financial control. Indeed, the more than three 
year delay in presentation of the audit is indicative of the bureau-
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cratic inefficiency he describes. Moreover, it is apparent that 
the inadequacies indentified in this report's predecessor (Molapo, 
1978) have not improved but considerably deteriorated. 
Where there are restrictions upon the expenditure of aid, the key 
to the process of leakage is the waiver principle. Whilst there 
are established procedures for the submission and approval of these 
waiver applications, the system's efficacy hinges crucially upon 
donor scrutiny of certificates of origin, and this, Tarr alleges, 
is where it breaks down. Theoretically, donors reserve the right 
to check on the origin, purpose and invoice of any purchase, analyse 
the accounts and evaluate the progress of those projects they are 
funding. This is a relatively easy matter in the case of directly 
funded aid, where the accounts are retained by the donor and the 
expatriates assigned to the project concerned, but, as Tarr shows, 
it proves impossible to accurately monitor funds as they pass 
"through-the-budget", in other words, through the local bureaucracy. 
So, even if donors were to refuse waiver applications or impose 
certain restrictions on local and third-country purchasing, they are 
not in a position to enforce decisions by detecting irregularities^. 
Donors may have to be content with signed statements of origin un-
supported by documentary evidence. And, in any case, there are diverse 
means of circumventing these regulations. For instance, it is apparent-
ly a relatively uncomplicated matter to forge certificates of origin, 
and it is also possible to satisfy the letter, if not the spirit, of 
the legislation by contracting to South.African or Lesotho based 
representatives or subsidiaries of companies operating in donor countries 
(Wellings, 1982, 287). 
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There would appear to be similar problems in respect of Tender 
Board regulations. Theoretically, all substantial public contracts 
should be submitted to this Board for consideration. Its purpose is 
to ensure healthy competition for these contracts, that bids are 
fair, and that approval is given to the cheapest and, where possible, 
to local Sesotho operations. When donors fund through-the-budget they 
have to assume, then, that Tender Board procedures will be followed 
correctly. However, Tarr shows in example after example that the 
Tender Board is being consistently ignored. 
'In the period under review', Tarr writes, 'ministries and depart-
ments continued to disregard Tender Board procedures relating to 
procurement of supplies and the awarding of construction contracts. 
In these cases, no action was taken against the responsible officers 
and retrospective approvals were invariably given to condone these 
irregularities. It is to be noted that the absence of competitive 
tendering without the approval of the Minister of Finance can lead 
to all sorts of undesirable consequences'.^ One such consequence 
12 
is the acceptance of wildly inflated bids; another, the approval 
of non-competitive tenders for unspecified reasons. An interesting 
case here was centred upon a road project for which several construct-
ion companies competed in November 1977. The locally-based consulting 
engineers, in consultation with the Ministry of Works, agreed that the 
lowest quotation, of just over R5.0m, was fair and this recommendation 
was accepted by the Tender Board in May 1978. However, 'upon invest-
igation', the Board rescinded its original decision on account of 
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alleged 'irregularities' and resolved to award the contract to the 
next lowest bidder. But, in June 1978, Works was instructed by the 
Ministry of Finance to re-award the contract to the third lowest. 
Although this decision resulted in an additional cost of over R1.3m 
for apparently no additional value, the reasons for it have remained 
mysterious J
3 
Yet another irregularity is the approval of Tender Board waivers 
by unauthorised persons or in retrospect without obvious cause. 
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Several examples cited by Tarr show just how relaxed this important 
control has become. The situation is such that payments can be made 
to any company or person without consultation with the Treasury or 
Finance. In March 1977, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture 
presented vouchers totalling R268 300 for payment of goods purchased 15 
without Tender Board authority or waiver notification. One conse-
quence of this irregularity could be over-payment on contracts, 
and another frivolous expenditure. 
Opportunities for fraud are also abundant. Auditory procedures are 
so slack that public servants could find it relatively easy to award 
themselves and/or partners contracts either directly through companies 
they own or have an interest in, or indirectly via fictitious companies 
which front for genuine operations. In the case of the latter, the 
bogus contractor subcontracts to and buys supplies from a legitimate 
company but inflates invoices to the government department or project 
concerned. In 1977, for example, an evaluation of the construction 
operations of one Ministerial Division concluded that R16 000 of the 
R30 000 disbursed to the contractor represented an overcharge. 
The audit investigation which followed discovered that one of the 
Division's engineers had been submitting the contracts to an un-
specified company and then inflating the charges. Such was the 
disregard for even the most basic accounting procedures at the 
Division, that this officer was able to prevent the origin of the 
invoices, and hence the identity of the 'real' contractor, being 
traced beyond his desk J ® 
As the report continues, Tarr makes it clear that the Tender 
Board, albeit an important mechanism, is only one of a series of 
financial controls in Lesotho which function improperly if they 
function at all. In 1979, an investigation into overexpenditure 
by the Maseru Township Office revealed that numerous fictitious 
disbursements totalling over R115 000 had been made between April 
1978 and August 1979. This had been made possible, claimed Tarr, 
by ' ... absolute laxity and absence of internal control systems 
within the Ministry of Interior as well as the Treasury.' The 
Court Judgement which followed spoke of 'disorder,' 'deplorable 
disregard for financial regulations,' and the 'complete breakdown 
18 
of financial discipline and control.' On the evidence of further 
examples quoted by Tarr, there can be little doubt that this state 
of affairs is ubiquitous within government. 
It is also clear that South African companies must benefit enormously 
from inefficient financial control in Lesotho. A specific example 
may be drawn from Tarr's examination of the government's 'summer 
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and winter cropping programme,
1
 The programme, which commenced 
tentatively in 1976, was intended to develop 41 000 acres of good 
arable land. The local farmers, on receipt of a subsidy, were re-
quired to vacate their land while the work, largely commercially 
oriented, was done by agricultural contractors from the Orange 
Free State. 
The statement of accounts reflected an astonishing loss of nearly 
26% of the original capital (R1.3m) excluding interest on the loans. 
Tarr's audit also disclosed that the standard of administrative, 
financial and accounting control was hopelessly ineffective. Tender 
Board regulations were flagrantly violated, asset registers were 
'lost' and basic books of account ineffectually maintained. Numer-
ous cases of fraud were detected; payment vouchers were duplicated 
and re-used, private contractors obtained government fuel free of 
charge, and disbursements to contractors referred to fictitious 
acreages of ploughed and planted land. With respect to this last 
point, Tarr makes reference to one South African contractor, which 
according to payments made, had ploughed 27 641 acres and planted 
24 214 acres. Tarr discovered that the actual acreage ploughed 
was 9 416 and that only 7 609 acres had been planted. It was cal-
culated that, as a result, the company had been overpaid by 
R205 000.
1 9 
Money was also lost through misunderstanding the plan of operations. 
Under the sharecropping agreement with the government, farmers had to 
acknowledge the debt of R12 per acre in respect of fractional cost 
of the scheme. There was no evidence, however, that contracts had 
- 17 -
been signed and the debts recovered. Similarly, although farmers 
were obliged to provide manual labour the programme was charged with 
20 
large labour costs and the government also awarded compensation 
for hail damage even though this was outside the terms of the orig-
21 
inal agreement and no insurance policy was taken to cover it-
Weakness in the management structure was not the only problem, 
however. From the point of view of viability, the 'programme was 
fundamentally misconceived. The risks involved were simply shunted 
from the farmer to the government. Apart from making land available 
the farmer's participation in the scheme was practically nil but, 
at the time of harvest, he was provided with 50% of the returns. 
The project is therefore a heavily subsidised one which appears to 
benefit only a number of selected farmers and the South African 
contractors (the participating farmers christened the programme 
'Ahlama U Je' - Manna has dropped from heaven). It has therefore been 
suggested that it may have more to do with securing political support 
than with the development of a viable and independent agricultural 
sector. 
The donors are not without blame of course. Some of the problems 
Tarr minutes are attributable to the recent escalation in aid com-
mitments. As the money poured in the government over-programmed and 
a considerable proportion of it remained unspent. The donors reacted 
by stretching the spending period and the government relaxed its own 
financial regulations to enhance ministerial spending capacities. 
Inevitably, this well intended authorisation was used imprudently 
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and incautiously and the result was absolute chaos. Expenditures 
were incurred on projects which had no financial provision or were 
far in excess of provided funds, and, in some cases, they were charged 
both to the project votes and to advance accounts leading to overdraft 
interest charges for which the government was liable. One example 
relates to the construction of the Hilton Hotel in 1977/78; whilst 
the voted provision was R3.0m, the expenditure charged to this vote 
was R612 000 and that charged to the advance account R3.549m, 
22 
creating a budgetary deficit of R1.16m. 
According to Tarr, then, the last decade in Lesotho has witnessed a 
progressive deterioration in financial management and administration. 
Extensive financial discipline has led to disregard of regulations 
and instructions and has culminated in the breakdown of accounting 
controls that has reached catastrophic dimensions in recent years. 
Inbuilt safeguards against financial irregularities have been vit-
iated and, through default and delay in the processing of public 
accounts, this has presented opportunities for the perpetration of 
peculation and fraud. The donors, it seems, do not fully appreciate 
that once they relax or dispense with the draconian restrictions 
normally applicable to tied aid, they release funds into a system 
incapable of handling them in accordance with their objectives. And, 
by channeling the monies through-the-budget, they transfer admin-
istration of the funds to the local bureaucracy. If the government's 
own audit Division is unable to discover where the money is going to, 
then it is unlikely that the donors will be more successful. Some, 
Tarr alleges, simply vanishes, buried in forgotten accounts or 
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misposted to non-existent votes; rather more is wasted on frivolous 
expenditures or lost on overcharges, and a considerable proportion 
is being creamed off via fraudulent claims on public monies and 
through collusion with contractors and suppliers. Thus, it is quite 
clear that local administration of the public accounts does very 
little to regulate the drainage of international capital to South 
African business, and in fact tends to aggravate the process by 
providing an ideal climate for corruption and exploitation, obscured 
by bureaucratic incompetence and negligence and unhindered by the 
rigorous implementation of the most basic accounting controls and 
checks. 
INDUSTRY, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL LEAKAGE 
Eighty-five per cent of the population of Lesotho is rural-based and 
heavily dependent upon subsistence cultivation and herding. Accord-
ingly, both the First (1970/71-1974/75; GOL, 1970, 24) and Second 
(1975/76-1979/80; GOL, 1975, 24) five year development plans emphasised 
development in this sector of the economy. In addition, most academic 
reports have favoured a policy of agricultural development complemented 
by the introduction of light agriculturally-focused industry (Robson, 
1967; Wallman, 1972; Ward, 1967; Winai-Strom, 1978) and the improvement 
of infrastructural facilities followed by the establishment of import-
substituting industrial production (Gray, Robertson and Walton, 1980). 
However, it is apparent that both donor and governmental commitment 
to rural development is declining steadily (Wellings, 1982, 277-283). 
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For instance, agriculture consumed 44.2% of development expenditure 
in 1974/75 but only 8.4% in 1979/80 (GOL,-1975, 36; GOL, 1980, 
28, 37). The rundown in the externally funded rural development effort, 
in response to the conspicuous failure of the area-based projects 
of the early 1970s, is not being compensated by any real increase 
in the domestic contribution which is being increasingly directed 
towards economic infrastructural development. This reversal in 
policy appears to have come about during the second plan period. 
Agriculture and economic infrastructure claimed 32.6% and 18.1% 
respectively of the original planned public investment between 
1975-and 1980, but the revised figures, calculated retrospectively, 
were 20.7% and 29.1% (GOL, 1980, 28). 
The government now considers the creation of a viable independent 
agricultural base an 'unrealistic objective,' and is 'anxious to 
move away from the simplistic concept of self-sufficiency ' (GOL, 
1980, 49). Although the government continues to make appropriate-
ly reassuring noises confirming its concern for the rural populace, 
rural development policy is now a confused pot-pourri of conflicting 
programmes comprising Food Aid, the low capital-intensity Basotho 
Agricultural Services Project and subsidisation schemes. Examining 
the most recent Capital Accounts, it is evident that the government 
has abandoned its once cherished vision of an autonomous self-
sustaining agricultural sector and is re-orienting investment, both 
locally and extraneously derived, towards capital-intensive, usually 
urban, projects where the returns are more visible and immediate 
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but which aggravate the import component of technology, materials, 
personnel and contractors. 
The major concern at present appears to be the provision of employ-
ment opportunities in the modern sector. It is estimated that there 
are 20 000 new entrants to the labour force every year in Lesotho 
(Montsi, 1982, 6) and, given that the modern sector presently accom-
modates only 40 000 Basotho, 56.2% of whom are engaged in non-
productive activities (GOL, 1980, 84) and that the number of labour 
migrants, totalling about 155 000 (GOL, 1980, 11) is likely to decline 
in the immediate future, (GOL, 1980; Taylor, 1982),their assimilation 
into this sector is obviously problematic. But while this propos-
ition is exceedingly ambitious, the answer is thought to lie with 
foreign, particularly South African, private investment; investment, 
that is, into industrial expansion. 'At present,' one official 
report asserts, 'Lesotho cannot provide enough employment opportun-
ities for all its people. The Government decided some time ago 
that the best method of solving this problem was to encourage the 
development of private enterprise both local and foreign. Local 
enterprise will not, at this stage of development, be sufficient to 
provide the required number of jobs. Hence strong reliance is 
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being placed on foreign investment.' Some academic observers 
also see advantages in a policy of increased economic co-operation 
with the Republic particularly in the realm of industrial production 
(Adams, 1978; Gurr, 1977; Selwyn, 1972; 1975), the justification 
being that it is easier to import capital than to generate it 
domestically and that it will only become possible to reduce depend-
ence once the industrial base is firmly
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The Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) was created 
in 1967 in order to, 'initiate, promote and'facilitate the develop-
ment of manufacturing, processing and mining industries and commerce 
in a manner calculated to raise the level of income and employment 
in Lesotho' (Moahloli, 1982, 2). In the period immediately following 
its establishment, LNDC undertook the initial roles of entrepreneur 
and investor and in 1975 the Basotho Enterprise Development Corpor-
ation (BEDCO) was launched to identify, support and stimulate local 
business. In 1978, however, BEDCO was hived off and re-organised 
as an autonomous parastatal. Although the activities of LNDC 
continue to impact upon those of BEDCO - by creating markets and 
providing a training environment - in recent years, its major 
strategem has been to attract foreign investment through promotion 
programmes and concessions on the establishment of plant in Lesotho. 
This policy has been primarily aimed at South Africa since: 
... it is on our doorstep and ... has many aggressive entrepreneurs 
who are eager to tackle the world markets. Many overseas companies 
are already operating in this market. It makes sense to approach 
the parent companies through their subsidiaries in the region. 
The economic and financial arrangements existing between Lesotho 
and South Africa make it worthwhile for South African companies 
to set up operations in Lesotho. LNDC has been very successful 
in this market - most companies which have responded positively 
to our call have come from this area (Montsi, 1982, 6) 
Originally it was the purpose of LNDC to invest its own capital 
in private enterprise commencing business in Lesotho, thereby 
retaining a measure of control at the management level. However, 
LNDC no longer seeks, 'equity participation in new ventures unless 
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it is absolutely necessary
1
 (Montsi, 1982, 6). This is in recognition 
of the scarcity of financial and trained manpower resources available 
to the Corporation and the tendency for businessmen to prefer maint-
aining equity investment within their own shareholding structures. 
LNDC will now invest in equity pnly in certain circumstances, usually 
upon invitation and normally contributing no more than 25% of the 
total. Hence, the Corporation does not demand local participation 
in company shareholding. In pursuing this policy, LNDC has recently 
disposed of several subsidiaries. By 1981, seven companies had been 
sold to private interests (Montsi, 1982, 7). 
Thus, since 1978 LNDC has concentrated more effort upon securing 
foreign investment in local industry from South Africa (and to some 
degree from Europe and Taiwan), and less upon the stimulation of 
Sesotho enterprise. There are three components to its promotion 
programme; the provision of a 'project service' to approved industries, 
the provision of concessions vis-a-vis financial transactions and 
transfers, and advantages in terms of accessibility to markets 
outside Lesotho. 
Included in LNDC's inducement package, under the Pioneer Industries 
Encouragement Act of 1967, are: a tax holiday up to six years (or 
tax allowances), training grants up to 75% for approved programmes, 
loans and loan guarantees from international "Line of Credit" sources 
such as EIB and the World Bank; custom-built factories on a variety 
of industrial sites; equity participation if required; industrial 
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estate layout and maintenance; administrative assistance apropos 
permits, plans, labour recruitment and project appraisal; and the 
assignment of a supervisory project officer. In place of the tax 
holiday, companies may apply for other allowances namely; 145%, 
75% and 45% grants towards machinery and equipment, factory buildings, 
and employees dwellings respectively. In addition, these companies 
may qualify for a 15% p.a. electricity rebate, a 110% annual cont-
ribution to the cost of training, a 10% annual wage subsidy over 
five years, and free water and sewerage on site, and transportation 
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within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
Lesotho also allows unimpeded repatriation of capital, profits and 
interest, and places no restrictions upon inward transfers of equity 
and capital. In addition, as a member of the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA), until recently Lesotho was able to offer entrepreneurs the 
use of the 'financial rand' investment mechanism. Lesotho has also 
secured double taxation agreements with South Africa, UK and West 
Germany. 
In terms of markets, Lesotho offers investors an opportunity to 
penetrate markets normally hostile to South African based producers. 
This is perhaps its biggest selling-point to investors. As E.R. 
Sekhonyana, then Minister of Planning, Employment and Economic 
Affairs remarked in 1982: 'Our forte lies in the acceptability of 
OC 
our products internationally, in most cases on concessionary terms.' 
Or, as Scott Moahloli (1982, 8-9) of LNDC put it to an audience of 
foreign businessmen: 
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Some of you may be seeking ways of entering the lucrative markets 
of the EEC but may be worried about import duties or possible re-
jection on political grounds. For similar reasons, you may be put 
off attempting to tackle the rapidly-growing markets in the black 
African countries. Non-South African companies among you may be 
wary of investing in the Republic because of possible political 
repurcussions back home. If you think like this, may I suggest 
that you owe it to your company and to your shareholders to at 
least consider the possiblity of solving all these problems by 
starting a manufacturing unit in Lesotho. 
The single most important market accessible from Lesotho is South 
Africa and its neighbouring states. As a member of SACU, Lesotho-
based industries qualify for duty-free entry into South Africa and 
other member countries, a factor that will interest multinationals 
hesitant to open or further operations in South Africa for political 
reasons, or relatively foot-loose South African companies interested 
in a "free-lunch" of concessions. Lesotho is also a signatory to 
the Yaounde I, II and L6me I and II trade conventions granting it 
the facility to export commodities to the EEC at zero or much re-
duced rates of duty (Rajana, 1982). This concession applies both 
to goods wholly produced in Lesotho and to goods comprising an 
import content provided that they have been "satisfactorily tranS-
pz* 
formed." Interestingly, a product need only have 25% "value-
added" in Lesotho to qualify for a Lesotho certificate of origin 
which means that goods produced in South Africa and "finished-off" 
in Lesotho can be exported preferentially to EEC markets. Although 
the quantities qualifying for this treatment are limited by quotas, 
ceilings and maximum-country amounts, under the L6m£ II (1983-85) 
agreements, the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) has been 
altered to introduce a system of differentiation in the allocation 
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of benefits. This individualisation of preferential shares has 
given less competitive exporters like Lesotho greater security in 
the European market. 
The Commonwealth and European countries outside the EEC also operate 
GSP schemes in favour of Lesotho. Japan and certain Eastern European 
countries grant preferential entry at a variety of levels for listed 
agricultural products and most industrial products are accorded 
either duty-free entry or entry at 50% the normal Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) rate. In addition, the USA provides duty-free bene-
fits for all listed items and lifts quota restrictions on certain 
products. Lesotho also advertises its accessibility to the black 
African market on concessionary terms as an inducement to foreign, 
particularly South African, investment. Lesotho is a member of the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and 
the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and has signed trade agreements 
with Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique providing reciprocal MFN 
discounts for the signatories' exports. Ironically, South African 
or South African based companies, by locating a subsidiary in Lesotho, 
can take advantage of markets organised with the intention of reducing 
the Republic's economic power in the region. 
LNDC regards its industrial policy as the only solution to the 
development problems facing the country. Results so far have been 
described as 'promising;' in 1981, twenty two projects with 1 400 
job opportunities were approved by LNDC (Montsi, 1982, 6). Although 
this adds only 8% to the level of industrial employment in the country 
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and remains a long way from absorbing the 20 000 entrants to the 
labour force in that year, LNDC is optimistic for the future. Lesotho 
is, it claims, 'regionally competitive" in the attraction of foreign 
investment, and it is this investment which will eventually manufact-
ure an independent industrial base for the country. 
LNDC policy, however, is not without criticism. At a general level, 
some would find it distressing to witness Lesotho-employing its 
favoured market status (which it received in response to its depend-
ence upon South Africa and its position as a "front-line" state) as 
an advertisement to South African and South African based companies 
specifically and purposefully denied such concessions. As Lothar 
Zimmer, (1982, 10) advisor of planning aid co-ordination in Lesotho 
remarked: 
I wish to draw particular attention to those foreign companies in 
South Africa who are under increasing political pressure because 
of their engagement there. To dwell in Lesotho within few kilo-
metres of South Africa is politically expedient at low cost. While 
one may say this is hypocritical because mainly South African inputs 
will be used anyway and the market is primarily in South Africa, I 
view this from a pragmatical (sic) standpoint: jobs and income are 
created in Lesotho - dogmas have never been able to feed people. 
The question that arises is will the international community be 
prepared to condone this situation indefinitely? Clearly, the 
objective of the LomS Convention as it applies to Lesotho is to 
encourage Sesotho and not South African capital. 
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Secondly, it is disturbing that LNDC imposes no legislation to 
prevent foreign companies taking advantage of inducements and 
concessions purely for short-term gain. If foreign companies 
repatriate their profits annually and their capital upon the 
expiration of LNDC support, as they are entitled to do, then 
the benefits accruing from that investment may in fact be neg-
ative in balance. The employment and income generated will be 
temporary and the LNDC package will effectively represent a sub-
sidisation of foreign industry. Whether foreign investors regard 
their Sesotho ventures as permanent or temporary concerns remains 
to be seen. 
Thirdly, one must question the wisdom of consigning the major respons-
ibility for industrial development to foreign companies. The level 
of foreign ownership in Lesotho's industrial sector is already high 
and growing (see Table 1; results of a survey of sixty one companies 
currently operating in Lesotho), the greatest share being taken by 
South African companies (see Table 2). Since Sesotho companies tend 
to be more labour intensive than foreign companies, the foreign owner-
ship of -industrial capital is likely to be more in the region of 50%. 
Moreover, in terms of joint ownership, examining the twenty five 
companies LNDC is associated with, around 50% of them are foreign 
controlled in respect of equity holdings (see Table 3) and, given 
LNDC's shortage of skilled manpower at the board level, de facto 
foreign control is likely to operate even where LNDC is the major-
ity shareholder, LNDC policy to the effect that local shareholding 
is not an obligatory condition for foreign investment contributes to 
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this situation. One effect of this is that Lesotho's power to 
shape industrial development policy is limited. Moreover, the 
development of Sesotho entrepreneurial talent seems to have been 
passed over. The emphasis has been placed on employment at the 
cost of advancement to professional and managerial levels. BEDCO 
appears now to be peripheral rather than central to industrial 
policy. 
TABLE 1 
Companies Operating in Lesotho : Level of Foreign Ownership 
No. % of 
total 
Employ-
ment 
% of 
total 
Average No. 
of employees 
per company 
Lesotho owned 25 41.0 1 051 20.3 42 
Lesotho/Foreign owned 23 37.7 2 982 57.5 129.7 
Foreign owned 13 21.3 1 149 22.2 88.4 
Sources: LNDC., 1982: Investment Guide to Lesotho; 1981, Maseru, 
pp. 19-20, and LNDC., 1982: Annual Report 1981, Maseru, 
pp. 12-13. 
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Fourthly, very few of the foreign companies locating in Lesotho are 
developing linkages with the rural economy v.ia the input of 
TABLE 2 
Companies Operating in Lesotho; Nationality of Owners 
Foreign ownership 
No. Employment 
South Africa 4 134 
South Africa/UK 2 330 
South Africa/West Germany 1 280 
South Africa/Netherlands 1 100 
UK 1 100 
Netherlands 1 45 
USA/Zimbabwe 1 120 
Taiwan 1 20 
Denmark 1 20 
Total 13 1 149 
Lesotho/Foreign ownership 
With South Africa 
With Taiwan 
With Netherlands 
With Netherlands/CDC 
Total 
19 2 342 
2 420 
1 20 
1 200 
23 2 982 
Sources: LNDC.,1982: Investment Guide to Lesotho: 1981, Maseru pp. 19-20, 
and LNDC., 1982: Annual Report, igsi, Maseru, pp. 12-13 
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technology and expertise into production and marketing. Only the 
mohair weaving industry has benefited from foreign capital and 
technology. The benefits of industrial development are therefore 
confined to the country's urban areas. In would appear that the 
Lesotho government regards unemployment as an urban problem which 
cannot be solved solely through rural development. 
TABLE 3 
LNDC's Equity holdings in Subsidiary and Associated Companies 
No. Companies Employment 
100% equity held 5 301 
76-99% equity held 1 86 
51-75% equity held 7 625 
50% equity held 5 436 
25-49% equity held 5 556 
Less than 25% equity held 2 106 
Total 25 2 110 
Source: LNDC., 1982: Annual Report 1981, Maseru, pp. 12-13 
Fifthly, although LNDC is primarily interested in attracting companies 
that will manufacture products which are cheaper than South African 
imports and more suitable for the local market, very few of those 
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that have invested in Lesotho are of this type. Although Table 4 
shows that perhaps 50% of the sixty one surveyed companies depend on 
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a "local market, most of these are commercial concerns or involved 
in construction, services and the sale of technical expertise. 
LNDC has had considerable success in attracting South African 
commercial capital but one of the most significant effects of the 
establishment of further distribution outlets in Lesotho 1s the 
acceleration of capital leakage through the improvement of access-
ibility to South African goods. OK Bazaars and Metro Holdings are 
two notable South African companies expanding these kind of enter-
prises' in Lesotho with LNDC assistance. Metro Lesotho, for example, 
has done exceptionally well from its outlets in this country. 
Commencing business in 1978 with one Cash and Carry in Maseru, the 
company now has six distributors in the major population centres 
and has increased sales and profits before tax on average 57% p.a 
and 100.6% p.a respectively (Lipchin, 1982, 4-6). 
TABLE 4 
Companies Operating in Lesotho: Markets 
No. % of total Employment % of total 
Lesotho only 34 55.7 1 876 36.2 
Lesotho/Foreign 18 29.5 1 361 26.3 
Foreign only 9 14.8 1 945 37.5 
Sources: LNDC., 1982: Investment Guide to Lesotho; 1981, Maseru, 
pp. 19-20, and LNDC., Annual Report 1981, Maseru, pp. 12-13. 
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The other kind of "local market" is that created by international 
aid through its deployment in development projects and through the 
creation of income in the modern sector. Urban services, water 
storage and supply, transport network development and construction, 
currently top priority in both domestic and donor expenditure, have 
generated a large market for a myriad of South African owned and 
South African based companies particularly in building and freight 
haulage. Some of the biggest companies to have located subsidiaries 
(and to benefit from LNDC assistance) in Lesotho operate in these 
sectors. Taiwan Construction (two thirds Taiwanese owned), Lesotho 
International Construction Company (40% owned by Wimpy International), 
Tranalquip (Dutch owned) and Hungerford-Schroeder (South African 
owned) are examples of companies engaged in building and engineering. 
Freightpak International and International Freight and Travel Services 
(both South African owned) comprise the major bulk distributors. 
In addition, several types of companies servicing the construction 
and engineering industries have established offices in the country. 
There are now a considerable number and diversity of South African 
owned garages offering vehicle and plant maintenance in Maseru and 
other centres, notably Maputsoe; no less than six foreign engineering 
consultancies, six (four foreign) architectural practices, and three 
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foreign quantity surveying partnerships. 
We have noted, then, that Lesotho has moved towards a modern sector 
development option. Given the conspicuous failure of the area-based 
rural development programmes in the early and mid 1970's this is 
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not altogether surprising. It is too early to assess the results 
of this strategem but it is clear that industrial development 
will have to be remarkably rapid if Lesotho is only to break even. 
Since modern sector development of this type is doing very little 
about rural underdevelopment in Lesotho it will have to cope with 
rural as well as urban job-seekers. It is also clear that this 
industrial option will aggravate the problem of capital leakage; 
firstly, because it raises the import component of materials, 
manufactures, technology and skills, and secondly, because it 
increases the presence and influence of foreign, mainly South 
African, capital in Lesotho. Employment is created by industrial 
expansion but the internal multiplier of the income it generates 
is depressed by the scarcity of Sesotho commerce and industry. 
CONCLUSION 
In any developing country it is imperative that internal and exter-
nally-derived funds are deployed efficiently and in such a manner 
that the domestic multiplier is maximised. This is particularly 
important in the case of Lesotho where the leakage of capital is 
encouraged by the country's dependence upon South African suppliers, 
contractors, technology and skills. This paper has pointed out that 
weak financial control in Lesotho's public administration (of both 
local and international funds) is aggravating the problem of leakage. 
It is suggested then that more stringent financial controls should 
be introduced as a matter of urgency. 
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This paper has also argued that Lesotho's present development 
strategy - industrial expansion through foreign investment - will 
also exacerbate the leakage situation. Moreover, by failing either 
to adequately protect or to encourage Sesotho commercial and industrial 
entrepreneurs, this strategy is more likely to increase rather than 
reduce Lesotho's dependence on South Africa and, as a means of 
generating employment, its cost-effectiveness may also be open to 
question. The government of Lesotho, then, may well have cause to 
rethink its development policy in the coming years and reconsider 
rural development as an alternative. 
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NOTES 
1. Discounting all settlements over 5 000 as 'urban
1
, 89% of Lesotho's 
1.3 million people lived in rural areas in 1980 (Wellings, 1983a). 
Agriculture is therefore virtually the only productive activity, 
contributing 37% of the GDP in 1977/78 (GOL, 1980, 8). 
2. Working on the basis of average inflation rates on imported South 
African non-perishable products of 12% between 1975/76 and 1980/81 
and 8% from 1966/67 to 1974/75 per annum (pers. comm.) and population 
growth rates of 2.3% (1970-79) and 2.0% (1960-70) (World Bank, 1981, 
166), aid allocations have increased in real terms at a rate of 2.6% 
p.a per capita between 1966 and 1980/81. 
3. LNDC., 1982 : Newsletter, 3, Maseru, p.3 
4. Pers. comm. 
5. Sunday Times, (Johannesburg), 3rd December 1978, 
6. Natal Witness, (Pietermaritzburg), 6th August- 1977; 
Natal Mercury, (Durban), 7th May 1977. 
7. Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
(now 'Trade and Industry'); Sunday Times, (Johannesburg), 
3rd December 1978. 
8. Tarr (1982, 19). 
9. Ibid., p. 17. 
10. Ibid., p. 5. 
11. Ibid., p. 8. 
12. Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
13. Ibid., pp. 98-99 
14. Ibid., p. 70, p. 71, p. 83. 
15. Ibid., p. 71. 
16. Ibid., p. 101. 
17. Ibid., p. 88. Note that this observation derives from the 
incomplete data available to Tarr for the period 31st March 
1978 to 31st March 1981, 
18. Ibid., p. 88. 
. 3 7 . 
19. Ibid., p. 51 . 
20. Ibid., pp. 42-47. 
21. Ibid., p. 57. 
22. Ibid., p. 10. 
23. LNDC., 1982: Investment Guide to Lesotho : 1981, Maseru, p. 2. 
24. Ibid. 
25. LNDC., 1982 : Annual Report 1981, Maseru, p. 5. 
26. Theoretically, this is achieved when the tariff heading of 
the finished product is changed from the heading before 
transformation. 
27. Two examples of this type of company are; Selkol, a subsidiary 
.of a South African industrial conglomerate, which has recently 
invested R200 000 into a Lesotho woodwork factory and plans to 
pump in a further R200 000 over two production phases (LNDC, 
1982: LNDC Newsletter, 3, p.8); and the Durban company, Khatani 
Industries, which acquired the Maseru based Kolonyama Candle 
Company in 1982 and, by investing over R750 000, intends to 
expand into soap and masterbatch production (LNDC., 1982: 
LNDC Newsletter, 2, p. 11). However, both companies intend 
to sell to the South African market as well as Lesotho. 
28. LNDC., 1982 : Investment (hide to Lesotho : 1981, Maseru. 
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